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JAPAN'S NEW PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW: INCREASED
PROTECTION FOR CONSUMERS
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of Japanese tort law is to compensate victims for
damages arising from the intentional or negligent violation of their
rights.' To promote this goal, Japan enacted the Products Liability
Law in June 1994. This law is a strict products liability law that
became effective July 1, 1995.2 Although the Products Liability
1. Minp6 (Civil Code), Law No. 89 of 1896, art. 709.
2. Seiz6butsu Sekinin H6, Law No. 85 of 1994. A translation of the Japanese
Products Liability Law appears below.
Purpose
Article One: The purpose of this law is to improve citizens' lives and
contribute to the healthy development of the economy. This law protects victims
by determining the manufacturer's liability for damages to life, body, and property
caused by product defects.
Definitions
Article Two:
1. This law defines "product" as manufactured or processed property.
2. This law defines "defect" as a product which lacks the expected safety
features of that product, considering the characteristics of the product, the normal
expected method of use, the time the manufacturer delivers the product, and
other conditions concerning the product.
3. This law defines "manufacturer" as any one of the following parties.
a. Person(s) who manufactures, processes, or imports the product (hereinaf-
ter called manufacturer).
b. Person(s) who acts as the manufacturer of a product which indicates its
name, trade name, or trademark (hereinafter called name indication) or who may
be misconceived as the manufacturer of the product by indicating its name.
c. Besides the above, person(s) who indicates its name on the product as the




The manufacturer is liable for damages to another person's life, body, or
property due to a defect in the delivered product which was manufactured,
processed, or imported by a manufacturer or b or c of the previous article, clause
three. However, if the damages occur to the product only, there is no liability.
Exemptions From Liability
Article Four
The manufacturer may avoid liability under the previous article by proving
one of the following:
1. Given the state of science and technology at the time of delivery, the
defect was not discoverable.
2. The allegedly defective product is a component of another product, and
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Law does not fully compensate victims for damages arising from
defective products, it better enhances consumer protection.3 In
addition, the new law improves the system of products liability
dispute resolution.
This Comment argues that procedural rules and other
obstacles limit tort victims' ability to gain access to, and recover
damages in, court. Thus, most victims of defective products will
depend on alternative dispute resolution for recovery. Although
most individuals will be able to recover some damages through
alternative dispute resolution, manufacturers are not completely
responsible for the harms they cause. Part II of this Comment
describes products liability law in Japan. Part III presents an
analysis of procedural rules and other factors that affect products
liability cases. Part IV provides a brief comparison of Japanese
and U.S. tort law. Part V explains alternative dispute resolution in
Japan. Part VI describes social changes that have occurred since
the enactment of the new Products Liability Law. Part ,VII
concludes that the alternative dispute resolution system and the
new Products Liability Law in Japan provide victims with better
recovery and better prevention of future product defects.




1. The right to claim the damages described in Article Three extinguishes if
the victim or his legal agent does not make a claim within three years of the time
when such damages or the responsible person becomes known, or within ten years
after the product is delivered.
2. Where the product is harmful when it accumulates in the body, discovery
shall be calculated from the time the damages occur or when symptoms for such
damages are manifested after a specific latent period.
Application of Civil Law
Article Six
Besides the law described herein, the liability of the manufacturer of
defective products is also governed by Civil Law (Law No. 89 of 1896).
Effective Date
This law shall become effective after one year has passed from the
publication date and applies to products delivered by a manufacturer after the
effective date.
3. A 1978 survey of civil law countries' products liability laws described Japan's
previous products liability laws as the "least progressive." Marcy Sheinwold, Comment,
International Products Liability Law, 1 TOURO J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257, 274-75 (1988).
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II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW IN JAPAN
A. Prior Negligence Law
Although a plaintiff may bring a products liability action under
breach of contract or tort,4 most plaintiffs file products liability
actions under tort provisions.
5
In Japan, a plaintiff in a products liability tort action must
prove five elements to recover against a manufacturer: (1) the
product must be defective; (2) the defect must result from the
defendant's act; (3) the plaintiff must suffer an injury; (4) the
defendant's product must have caused the plaintiff's injury; and (5)
the defendant must have breached the duty of care owed to the
plaintiff.6 As in the United States, a manufacturer may be liable
for negligence in the manufacturing process, product design, or the
sufficiency of warnings.7
Although the Japanese tort provisions are similar to U.S.
negligence principles,8 their effect in society differs tremendously.
Instead of looking to the courts, Japanese society has traditionally
relied on rigorous regulation for consumer protection.9 Also,
certain industries require manufacturers to contribute to a fund
that compensates the victims of the industry's defective products."0
Thus, although a special products liability law did not protect
4. MINPO, Law No. 89 of 1896, art. 709.
5. Catherine Dauvergne, The Enactment of Japan's Product Liability Law, 28 U. B.C.
L. REV. 403, 405 (1994). This is most likely because the plaintiff must establish privity of
contract, which is a difficult element to prove, in order to prove breach of contract. See
id.
6. Id. at 406.
7. Mark A. Behrens & Daniel H. Raddock, Japan's New Product Liability Law: The
Citadel of Strict Liability Falls, but Access to Recovery is Limited by Formidable Barriers,
16 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 669, 679-80 (1995).
8. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1966) (outlining the
general rule for Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer).
9. From 1946 to 1993, Japanese courts decided only 145 products liability suits. Dau-
vergne, supra note 5, at 404. In contrast, U.S. federal and state courts decide over 400,000
product liability cases per year. Manabu Hayashida, PL Taio, Jyoho Sentaa De
[Information Center Deals with Product Liability], NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, June 30, 1995.
10. Dauvergne, supra note 5, at 404. Examples of statutory compensation schemes
include the "Consumer Daily Life Appliances Safety Law," which required a "safety
goods" seal for appliances and set up a compensation fund for appliance defect victims, and
the "Act Concerning the Fund for Relief of Drug Side Effects," which established a fund
for pharmaceutical defect victims. Dauvergne, supra note 5, at 406-07 (citing MINPO, Law
No. 31 of 1973; MINPO, Law No. 55 of 1979).
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consumers in court, the government offered some means of
compensation in the event that a defective product injured an
individual.
B. New Strict Products Liability Law
After the outbreak of several mass tort cases in the 1960's, the
Japanese government began investigating the possibility of
instituting a strict products liability framework." As the consum-
ers' movement grew, various groups pressured Japanese political
leaders to establish a new products liability legal framework that
would allow greater recovery against manufacturers and provide
recourse for defective imported goods.12 Politicians did not view
implementing more stringent safety regulations as a practical
alternative because foreign countries would view the regulations as
trade barriers. 3 Similarly, Japanese business leaders, voicing their
opinion through Keidanren, 4 wanted to avoid a "litigation
explosion" similar to the United States.5
In 1993, an alliance of political parties displaced the conserva-
tive Liberal Democratic Party's ruling party service and adopted
the current consumer-oriented Products Liability Law. 6 The
resulting legislation holds manufacturers strictly liable for their
defective products, subject to two defenses: a. "development risk
defense" and a "flawless component defense."' 7 In contrast to the
prior tort regime, plaintiffs no longer need to prove negligence on
the part of manufacturers. Under the new law, a plaintiff only
needs to prove that the product has a defect in order to recover
damages.'
8
11. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 7, at 686.
12. Dauvergne, supra note 5, at 407.
13. Id.
14. Id. Keidanren is the Federation of Economic Organizations. Keidanren's members
include Japanese business leaders who collectively exert a considerable amount of political
power over Japan's macroeconomic policy. FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN POSTWAR JAPAN 28 (1987).
15. Dauvergne, supra note 5, at 408.
16. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 7, at 688-89.
17. SEIZOBUTSU SEKININ HO, supra note 2. The law defines "manufacturer,"
"development risk defense," and "flawless component defense" in its text. Id.
18. Dauvergne, supra note 5, at 415.
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III. CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES AND OTHER FACTORS WILL
LIMIT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW LAW IN COURT
Proving that a product is defective, and arguing against the
development risk or flawless component defenses, will be extremely
difficult for most victims. The Japanese court system does not
offer many of the procedural tools available to plaintiffs in the
United States, such as discovery, class actions, and a right to a jury
trial in civil actions.19 Due to these procedural and other obsta-
cles, the new Products Liability Law will not guarantee recovery to
victims of defective products through the Japanese courts.
A. Historical Development of the Japanese Legal System
To understand current Japanese procedural law, one must
begin with an analysis of the legal system of the Tokugawa Era,"
when samurai dominated Japan. The samurai worked as regional
leaders for the shogun in Tokyo. The samurai lacked a support
system and bureaucracy. Thus, the samurai's role in the legal
system could be defined as "judge, jury, and executioner."21
Japan adopted many of the Chinese legal codes, which
included substantive and procedural laws. Like the Japanese
system, however, Chinese Confucianism did not promote participa-
tion in the legal system. Confucianism emphasized harmony and
relations between people. Society expected the social inferior to
defer to his social superior.22 Taking someone to court created
disharmony and society frowned upon it. 3
Japanese called the obligations stemming from one's relation
to others "giri."24 Although the person owing a duty through giri
was expected to perform, the recipient of the duty had no right to
19. Maurice Rosenberg & Takeshi Kojima, Reform of Procedure and Rule-Making
(May 1984), in PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL JUSTICE AND ADR: JAPAN AND THE U.S.A. 179,
184-99 (Takeshi Kojima ed., 1990) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES].
20. The Tokugawa Era, also called the Edo period, lasted from 1603 to 1853. Behrens
& Raddock, supra note 7, at 671-72.
21. Harold See, The Judiciary and Dispute Resolution in Japan: A Survey, 10 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 339, 352 (1982).
22. Id. For example, the contractor should defer to the owner, the lessee to the lessor,
the employee to the employer, and the seller to the buyer. Id.
23. Id. at 355.
24. Id. at 341.
19961
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
demand performance of the duty.25 Thus, instead of relying on
the legal system for performance of duties, the Japanese relied on
honor.26
A series of legislative measures aided the development of the
law. Japan enacted the Code of a Hundred Articles in 1742.27
Although the Code added considerable depth to the legal system,
it mainly consisted of instructions to the officials on how to judge
and punish, rather than rules for the people.28 The Meiji Restora-
tion in 1868 brought the emperor back to a supreme political
position and led to the adoption of the Meiji Constitution in
1889.29 Although Japan later adopted codes based on French and
German law, the forms of dispute resolution changed little until
1947, when the present Constitution was written. Prepared under
strict U.S. review, the present Constitution finally became a
protector of individuals' rights.3" Based on this Constitution,
Japan now has a legal basis for claiming rights. Many of the
ancient social expectations that discourage involvement in the legal
system, however, are still present in the Japanese psyche and
procedural rules.
B. The High Burden of Proof
The burden of proof on the Japanese civil plaintiff is much
higher than in -the United States.31  Article 185 of the Japanese
Code of Civil Procedure governs how judges should make deci-
sions. 3' Although the Code does not provide any formal rules on
proof, the prevailing view is that proof is required "beyond a
reasonable doubt,"33 even in civil cases. Generally speaking, the
standard of proof in Japan requires the judge to be 80-90% sure of
his decisions. When the judge is less than 80% sure, the party who
25. Id. at 341 n.9 (citing YOSIYUKI NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW 175
(Anthony H. Angelo ed. & trans., 1976)).
26. Id. at 341 n.11 (quoting NODA, supra note 25, at 178).
27. Id. at 341.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 343.
30. Id. at 348.
31. See TAKAAKI HATTORI & DAN F. HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN
§ 7.05[13], at 7-75 to 7-78 (1985).
32. MINJI SOSHOHO (Code of Civil Procedure), Law No. 29 of 1890 [MINSOHO] art. 185.
33. HATrORI & HENDERSON, supra note 31, § 7.05[13][b], at 7-76 to 7-77.
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has the burden of proof is defeated.34 This higher standard of
proof makes it difficult for a victim to establish a case against a
manufacturer, and thus, deters plaintiffs from filing a suit because
they face such a statistically small chance of success.35
C. The Low Level of Pretrial Discovery
Compared to the United States,3 6 pretrial discovery is very
limited in Japan.37 Courts allow proof-taking prior to commence-
ment of an action or prior to trial only for the purpose of preserv-
ing evidence.3 8 A motion for the preservation of evidence will be
successful only in extraordinary circumstances, such as when a
future witness is seriously ill or the real property in question is
about to be altered or destroyed. The non-appealability of the
court's decision on a motion for the preservation of evidence
further limits the amount of information available to a potential
plaintiff.39  The lack of pretrial discovery makes it much more
difficult for a Japanese plaintiff to prove his case than his U.S.
counterpart, who may file a lawsuit and receive a license for a
legally sanctioned "fishing expedition"4 to recover information
through discovery.4'
D. The Lack of a Class Action Provision
In Japan, scattered victims of mass torts may not join in one
lawsuit against a single defendant because the Code of Civil
Procedure contains no provision for class actions.4" The lack of
a class action provision makes it especially difficult for individual
34. Maurice Rosenberg & Takeshi Kojima, The Adversary System (May 1984), in
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 19, at 117, 147; cf H. Kaneko, Rissho Sekinin [Responsibility
for Adducing Proof], in 2 MINJI SOSHOHO KOZA [LECTURES ON THE LAW OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE] 568 (1954) (requiring 99% certainty as the standard of proof).
35. Rosenberg & Kojima, supra note 34, at 148.
36. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (U.S. federal courts' discovery rule.)
37. Dauvergne, supra note 5, at 408.
38. MINSOHO art. 343. In contrast, the scope of discovery in U.S. federal courts is "any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
39. MINSOHO art. 348.
40. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
41. Pretrial discovery is one of the most important aspects of litigation in the United
States. WARREN FREEDMAN, THE TORT OF DISCOVERY ABUSE 3 (1989).
42. Takeshi Kojima, Protection of Diffuse, Fragmented, and Collective Interests in Civil
Litigation, 17 J. COMP. L. 1 (1983), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 19, at 3, 16. In
contrast, Federal Rule 23 permits class actions in U.S. federal courts. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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victims, who each have only a small amount of evidence, to meet
a high burden of proof against a manufacturer.
4 3
Some provisions in the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure,
however, allow a group of victims to work together against a single
defendant. Under Article 132, for example, if all of the claims are
in one court, the court may consolidate oral arguments." Given
today's mass production and advanced distribution systems,
however, users of any single product are likely to be spread out
among many districts. Thus, claims for the same type of defect will
be brought in many court districts, and the plaintiffs will be unable
to utilize the consolidation rule. In most cases, the consolidation
rule will not aid victims of defective products in accumulating
evidence against defendant manufacturers.
Another procedural tool that permits multiple plaintiffs to join
in a lawsuit against a defendant is joint litigation. Article 59 allows
joint litigation when two or more persons have rights or liabilities
in common, or where the subject of their suits is based on the same
ground in fact and in law.4" Using this procedural tool is prob-
lematic because it requires a tremendous amount of organization
on the part of the plaintiffs.
46
One successful example of joint litigation is the Tsuruoka Oil
Price Fixing Case.47 In this case, 1654 plaintiffs sued 12 oil
companies for damages from illegal cartels, with average damages
of Y2300 per person. A consumer cooperative organized most of
the plaintiffs' case.48 Due to the provision's complexity, however,
joint litigation is not an answer to the plaintiff's need to get more
evidence.
One last procedural tool that allows plaintiffs to collaborate in
43. Kojima, supra note 42, at 24. Rule 23 specifically addressed this problem. One of
the purposes of Rule 23 was to make it easier for individuals, whose claims were too small
to merit an independent action, to receive compensation for their damages. AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT 35 (Apr. 5,
1993).
44. MINSOHO art. 132. In U.S. federal courts, Rule 42 allows consolidation. FED. R.
Civ. P. 42.
45. MINSOHO art. 59. This provision is similar to the U.S. joinder rules. FED. R. Civ.
P. 19-20.
46. Kojima, supra note 42, at 31.
47. Id. The District Court eventually dismissed this case because the plaintiffs failed
to prove damages. Id. at 32.
48. Id.
900 [Vol. 18:893
Japan's New Products Liability Law
the courtroom is the "appointed party" (sentei tojisha) rule.49
Article 47 allows a group of plaintiffs with a common interest to
appoint one party to act as their representative. The decision in
the representative's case is then extended to the other group
members through res judicata.50 This provision creates difficulties
for plaintiffs because the entire group must authorize the selected
representative, usually resulting in a smaller group.5 Like the
above provisions, this rule assists victims of defective products in
only a limited way.
E. The Burden of Paying Court Fees
In Japan, the losing party must pay all court fees.52 In some
circumstances, though, the court may require the winning party to
bear all or part of the expenses of the proceedings. Judges may
shift the financial burden when the winning party commits acts that
are "unnecessary for the assertion or defense of his right. ' 53 The
courts have viewed plaintiffs who bring suits without offering to
negotiate as committing unnecessary acts that create liability for
court costs. 54  Thus, plaintiffs potentially face having to pay all
litigation expenses if their suit is unsuccessful, and possibly even if
successful.
A plaintiff who has no office or place of business in Japan
must provide security for the estimated court costs at the beginning
of the trial.5 The plaintiff must replenish the security if it becomes
deficient.56 Most victims of defective products do not have an
office or place of business in Japan, and therefore, the court
requires them to provide funds for the estimated court costs in
advance.57 Undoubtedly, this requirement makes most products
liability plaintiffs more cautious about initiating litigation.
58
.49. MINSOHO art. 47.
50. Id. art. 201.
51. Kojima, supra note 42, at 33.
52. MINSOHO art. 89.
53. Id. art. 90.
54. HATTORI & HENDERSON, supra note 31, § 10.02 at 10-4 to 10-5.
55. MINSOHO art. 107(1).
56. Id.
57. Court fees are proportionate to the benefit in dispute, generally between 0.5-1.0%.
Takeshi Kojima, Western Style Legal Aid and Japan's Choice (Oct. 30-31, 1984), in JAPAN
LEGAL AID ASS'N, THE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM AND LEGAL AID REPORT 79-93
(1984), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 19, at 53, 61.
58. Id.
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Fortunately, the Code of Civil Procedure allows postponement
of the court fee payment if the plaintiff satisfies a means test and
a merit test.59  The court must find that 'the plaintiff has both
insufficient resources and a strong chance of winning his case in
order to provide "legal aid in litigation."' Therefore, in a few
circumstances, there is some relief available to a victim of limited
means.
F The Lack of Contingency Fees
Besides the Code of Civil Procedure, many other aspects of
the Japanese legal system limit the availability of justice through
the courts or discourage plaintiffs from using the court system for
resolving disputes. For example, the Japanese Code does not
recognize contingency fees.6 Under a contingency fee agreement,
an attorney represents a client for compensation based on a
percentage of the amount recovered,62 so the client owes nothing
to the attorney if nothing is recovered.63 Such agreements are
unique to the United States.' Many commentators cite contin-
gency fees as a major cause of the litigation explosion in the
United States because contingency fees make the court system
more accessible to plaintiffs.65 Arguably, the opposite is true in
Japan, where the lack of contingency fees closes the court system
to potential plaintiffs.
66
Although the Japanese Code does not provide for contingency
fees, some lawyers will accept cases with an "implicit" contingency
fee arrangement. 67  Typically, Japanese clients pay lawyer's fees
in installments. If a client's financial resources are limited, a
lawyer may lower, the initial fee payment, with the balance due
upon completion of the case. Unlike the U.S. contingency fee
system, the client still is liable for paying the lawyer's fees if the
suit is unsuccessful.68 If the client has no other resources, the
59. MINSOHO art. 118.
60. Kojima, supra note 57, at 62.
61. Rosenberg & Kojima, supra note 19, at 184.
62. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 614 (6th ed. 1990).
63. Rosenberg & Kojima, supra note 19, at 184.
64. Marc S. Klein & Sills C. Z. Rodin, Megatrends in International Product Liability
Law, C949 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 113, 121 (1994).
65. Rosenberg & Kojima, supra note 19, at 184.
66. Id.
67. Klein, supra note 64, at 121.
68. Kojima, supra note 57, at 67.
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lawyer may never be able to collect the balance due, and the end
result is a contingency fee arrangement.
For a more concrete example of how a fee arrangement similar
to the above contingency fee system works out, take the case
where a plaintiff's lawyer is involved in a $40,000 dispute. The
lawyer would usually ask for 5% ($2000) up front for legal fees; in
the event of a favorable verdict, the lawyer would receive an extra
7% ($2800). 6
G. The Lack of Jury Trials in Civil Cases
Japanese courts do not use juries to determine facts such as
the amount of damages in civil cases. 7° Commentators widely cite
to jury involvement in civil trials as another cause of the U.S.
litigation explosion because the use of a jury in U.S. civil cases
favors verdicts finding liability on the part of a defendant manufac-
turer and higher levels of damages. 71  Some speculate that the
converse is also true: a lack of juries discourages plaintiffs from
filing suits. 72  In any case, the use of juries increases verdict
uncertainty.73  This uncertainty encourages some plaintiffs to
gamble that their prospects might be better in court than settling
out of court.
H. No Recovery for Non-Economic Damages
The Japanese Code does not allow recovery of non-economic
damages. 74  For example, a plaintiff in Japan cannot recover
69. Stephen J. Carroll et al., On Mass Tort and Alternative Dispute Resolution (Dec.
1984), in BEtE NIOKERU SHOKIBOFUNSO-SHORI JITrAI HOKOKUSHO (Koji Shindo ed.,
1986), reprinted in PERSPECIVES, supra note 19, at 352, 363.
70. Takeshi Kojima, Civil Procedure in Japan, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1218 (1990).
Calculating damages is very straightforward. For example, the formula for determining loss
of income in case of death is:
S = (I-E) x ((1/1+r) + (1/1+2r) + . . . (l/l-r)
S= the amount of lost income
I= the amount of annual income of the victim at the time of death
E= the amount of the victim's annual living expenses (usually 30-50% of income)
n= expected remaining years of employability
r= legal interest rate
7 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN § 4.05(7) (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1994). To calculate loss of
income damages, the judge only needs to solve the equation by plugging in the variables.
71. Rosenberg & Kojima, supra note 19, at 191.
72. Klein, supra note 64, at 121.
73. Carroll et al., supra note 69, at 365.
74. Klein, supra note 64, at 122.
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punitive damages or damages for pain and suffering.15  Due to
this rule, the Osaka District Court ordered Matsushita Electric
Industrial Company to pay only Y4.4 million (approximately
$42,000) in damages for an office building that burned down due
to a defective television set that caught fire.76 The court also
encouraged the family of a man who died in a fire caused by a
defective television to settle for only ¥18 million (approximately
$171,000) in damages.77 Plaintiffs will be discouraged from filing
suit when the economic damages in question are not very high
because the quantum of possible damages is limited in this way.
To some degree, Japanese courts reduce the perceived
injustice stemming from the prohibition on non-economic damages
by awarding "solace money" (isharyo).78 Although solace money
in Japan and punitive damages in the United States both have the
effect of increasing the amount a plaintiff may recover for econom-
ic damages, in practice, solace money exposes a defendant to much
less risk than punitive damages. 79  Thus, the Japanese plaintiff's
recovery is still limited, and the potential award of a fantastic
windfall does not promote lawsuits.
L The Small Number of Attorneys in Japan
Finally, Japan has far fewer attorneys than the United
States.8 ° In order to become an attorney in Japan, one must pass
an exam. Although about 30,000 applicants take the exam each
75. 7 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 70, at § 4.05(7).
76. Judgment of Mar. 29, 1994, Osaka Chisai [Osaka District Court], Matsushita Denki
Ni Baishou-Meirei [Damages Judgment Against Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.], YOMIURI
SHINBUN, Mar. 30, 1994. For an interesting analysis of how a U.S. court might decide this
case, see generally MASAYUKI TAKAYAMA & JULIA TACHIKAWA, LITIGATION DROWNS
AMERICA 107-09 (1995). The authors speculate that a U.S. court would award damages
of at least $100 million after totaling the damages from the fire, the loss of all documents
and records, profit loss, the pain and suffering and losses to the people who worked in the
destroyed building, and punitive damages against Matsushita Electric Industrial Company,
based on its market share and annual gross sales, for its bad faith in dealing with the
plaintiffs. Id.
77. Matsushita Agrees to Pay Damages for TV-Caused Fire, Kyodo News Service, Nov.
25, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Japan File.
78. Article 711 of the Civil Code allows the award of solace money. MINPO art. 711.
79. Kojima, supra note 42, at 37.
80. 2 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 70, at § 3.02(3). About 12,000 attorneys
practice in Japan, which has a population of over 100 million. The United States, with
roughly twice the population of Japan, has about 850,000 qualified attorneys. Kenneth
Lasson, Lawyering Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Fees and Justice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 723,
723 n.4 (1994).
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year, fewer than 500 people pass.8' There is little competition in
fees and services, and attorneys are less willing to take on small or
dubious cases, because there are so few attorneys.8 2  Thus,
plaintiffs who wish to file suit may find it difficult to obtain
adequate legal representation.
As described above, the Japanese court system is extremely
inaccessible to victims of defective products. The next section of
this Comment will examine how the U.S. court system handles
products liability claims. Although U.S. courts are more open to
plaintiffs, the procedural rules make the system inefficient, and
ironically, may deny justice in their own way.
IV. BRIEF COMPARISON WITH PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES
The U.S. tort industry overwhelms the Japanese legal system.
More than 800,000 tort claims are filed each year in the United
States.83 In 1985, total compensation to tort plaintiffs through the
U.S. court system exceeded $20 billion.' Due to the availability
of contingency fees, flexible procedural rules, statutes that
encourage plaintiffs to sue, and other cultural attitudes favoring
dispute resolution in court," justice through the court system for
tort claims appears accessible to all who seek it.
The system, however, is not without problems. Tort litigation
is tremendously expensive for all parties involved. In 1985, $16 to
$19 billion was spent on tort litigation.86 Not only do litigation
costs increase the ultimate price consumers pay for the products
involved, but they also make U.S.-made products less competitive
abroad.87  In addition, tort litigation imposes administrative
burdens on the parties involved and can cause corporate bank-
81. Behrens & Raddock, supra note 7, at 678. Some believe these statistics indicate
the Japanese government's unwritten policy of discouraging litigation. Id.
82. Dan F. Henderson et al., Mediation and Arbitration in Japan and the U.S. (Nov.
1984), in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 19, at 279, 287.
83. JOHN G. FLEMING, THE AMERICAN TORT PROCESS 1 (1988).
84. Id.
85. Rosenberg & Kojima, supra note 19, at 184-99.
86. JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN
TORT LITIGATION 67 (1986). This figure does not include any compensation paid to
plaintiffs.
87. Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, Civil Justice Reform in America: A
Question of Parity with Our International Rivals, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 1, 4 (1992).
19961 905
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
ruptcy.88 Further, the threat of possible tort litigation deters some
manufacturers from releasing useful products into the market.
89
Clearly, individual justice comes at a cost.
A. Historical Development of Products Liability Law
Products liability law evolved from no liability to fault-based
liability to strict liability.' Before the 1800's, there were few tort
cases because of the expense of tort litigation, the availability of
regulatory statutes to protect consumers, and cultural attitudes.9'
Economic expansion in the 19th century led to more transactions
between unrelated parties, and consequently, more dispute resolu-
tion in courts. Courts initially focused on contract law to settle
product defect disputes, but soon came to realize that many
transactions did not involve consensual agreements.92
In 1893, the courts developed an implied warranty of mer-
chantability to protect commercial buyers. 93 Implied warranties,
in general, had a strict standard, and thus were biased against the
manufacturer. 9 A privity of contract requirement and the terms
of the warranty, however, restricted a breach of warranty action.
In addition, a breach of warranty action did not allow recovery of
punitive damages. Thus, this remedy was not available to many
buyers.95
By the 20th century, the courts realized that many contracts
were not "bargained for," and therefore contract law should not be
the sole solution for product defect claims. 96  By 1915, tort
liability no longer required privity of contract. 97 Negligence
became the standard for liability. In many instances, however, the
negligence standard did not help plaintiffs because the case became
more complex and the law more uncertain. Litigation became slow
and expensive.98
88. JANE STAPLETON, PRODUCT LIABILITY 31 (1994).
89. Id. at 32. The swine-flu vaccine is one example of this phenomenon. Id.
90. VINCENT R. JOHNSON, MASTERING TORTS 169 (1995).
91. STAPLETON, supra note 88, at 9-10.
92. Id. at 10.
93. Id. at 11.
94. Id. at 12.
95. JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 169.
96. STAPLETON, supra note 88, at 19.
97. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
98. JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 169.
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The case Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno9" con-
cerned an exploding Coke bottle that injured a waitress. In his
concurring opinion, Justice Traynor first suggested the adoption of
a strict liability standard for defective products, although the court
found liability based on a negligence standard. Following the
decision, nearly all jurisdictions rapidly embraced some sort of
strict products liability standard"° similar to Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, entitled Special Liability of Seller
of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer."' Presently,
if a defective product injures a person, that person has a cause of
action for breach of warranty, ordinary negligence, or strict liability
in tort. 2
Originally, the definition of "defect" only included manufactur-
ing defects. A manufacturing defect occurs when the product in
question leaves the seller's hands in a condition inconsistent with
the manufacturer's plan. For example, a manufacturing defect
exists when the product is missing a screw or includes a wrong size
screw. °3 In these situations, the plaintiff in a strict products
liability action only needs to prove that the product was defective
when it left the manufacturer and does not need to prove negli-
gence."
In the 1970's, courts expanded the definition of "defect" to
include design defects.1 5 The issue in a design defect case is
whether the product was "safe enough."' 6 " In making its deci-
sion, the court will balance the utility of the product against the
actual danger of the product. The degree of foreseeable danger is
not relevant. The mere fact that a design could have been safer
will not satisfy the court. Rather, the plaintiff must show that the
safer design was both technically feasible and practicable."°7
With the recognition of design defects, the number of products
liability cases grew exponentially because once a design defect was
identified, the whole production line could be labeled defective"s
99. 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
100. STAPLETON, supra note 88, at 25.
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1966).
102. JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 169.
103. Id. at 172.
104. Id.
105. STAPLETON, supra note 88, at 29.
106. JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 172.
107. Id. at 173-74.
108. FLEMING, supra note 83, at 14.
19961
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
The courts further expanded the definition of "defect" to
include failure to warn cases. In such cases, the court may find
liability when the warning of dangers is inadequate, which occurs
if the manufacturer does not (1) specify the risk, (2) disclose the
reason for the warning, or (3) reach foreseeable users with the
warning. 09
In summary, the United States has gradually broadened the
scope of products liability. Many commentators attribute this trend
to the United States' lack of welfare programs, programs which are
readily available in other Western countries, in the United States.
Thus, these commentators feel that more judicial social reform is
needed."0  Others blame the attitude of the U.S. public, which
pressures the court system to compensate all individuals who suffer
an injury."' Due to the novelty of Japan's Products Liability
Law, it is uncertain whether Japanese courts will follow the same
path, recognizing design defects and failure to warn cases, but
certainly the social conditions for change differ from the United
States.
B. Civil Procedure Rules Open the Courts to Plaintiffs
The U.S. judicial system provides many tools to plaintiffs that
make the courts more accessible. Procedural rules for mass torts
are particularly well developed because the U.S. courts have dealt
with far more of these cases than any other country."2  Most
mass torts are litigated in federal court due to diversity jurisdic-
tion,' thus, this section will focus on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Three main procedural tools aid plaintiffs in mass tort actions.
First, consolidation allows courts to transfer cases to one location
for pretrial proceedings if the cases have at least one common
109. JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 174.
110. FLEMING, supra note 83, at 11. See also Stephen C. Yeazell, The Salience of
Salience: A Comment on Professor Hazard's Authority on the Dock, 69 B.U. L. REV. 481,
484 (1989).
111. Rosenberg & Kojima, supra note 19, at 189. Rosenberg goes so far as to say that
"[tlhe United States has made the courthouses the great secular temples and has made
suing a religion." Id. at 187.
112. FLEMING, supra note 83, at 236. The rules are so well-developed that foreign
plaintiffs often hope to take advantage of them whenever possible. For example, the
victims of a Turkish Airlines crash outside of Paris litigated their case in the United States.
Id.
113. Id. at 237.
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question of law or fact. 14 Although this rule only applies to
pretrial proceedings, this pretrial period may be the most important
for a case because it includes discovery, summary judgment, and
sometimes settlement." 5
Second, class actions allow multiple plaintiffs to sue in a single
lawsuit. Plaintiffs may bring a class action if the class is so numer-
ous that joinder of all members is impracticable, there are common
questions of law or fact, the claims of the representatives are
typical of the claims of the class, and the representatives will fairly
protect the interests of the class. 16 In order to be certified, the
plaintiffs must also prove either that separate actions would create
a risk of inconsistent adjudications, or that relief would be
appropriate for the class as a whole because the party opposing the
class has acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, or that
common questions of law or fact predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members."7 Certification for a class
action in a products liability suit is difficult because the case will
usually consist of a series of discrete events. Thus, individual facts
and issues, rather than common facts and issues, will dominate. 1 8
Third, all claims may be combined in the event of the
corporate reorganization of the defendant. For example, when the
Johns-Manville Corporation filed for bankruptcy.proceedings under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act, the bankruptcy proceedings
discharged more than 10,000 asbestos claims. 9 This procedure
allows the business to continue operating while it generates profits
to pay its victims. 2 °
Although these procedural tools were created to benefit
plaintiffs, they often create more problems than they solve. Merely
determining whether a procedural rule is applicable consumes a
great deal of court time.' For example, In re Bendectin Prod-
ucts Liability Litigation"' was an appellate case entirely devoted
to determining the certification of a class action. The court
114. FED. R. Civ. P. 42.
115. FLEMING, supra note 83, at 238.
116. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
117. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b).
118. FLEMING, supra note 83, at 241.
119. Id. at 250.
120. Id.
121. Patricia Howlett, Comment, Compensation for Drug Induced Fetal Deformities in
Common and Civil Law Systems, 2 TOURO J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243, 258 (1991).
122. 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984).
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devoted eight years to arguments on procedural issues before it
even started considering whether Bendectin caused birth de-
fects.
123
The procedural complexity and uncertainty of these types of
suits is a major reason why more than 95% of all tort claims settle
out of court.124 Thus, although the civil procedure rules appear
to open the U.S. courts to plaintiffs, they actually close the door to
courtroom justice in many cases.
C. Contingency Fees: The Poor Man's Key to the Courthouse
Contingency fees, the "poor man's key to the courthouse,'
125
are unique to the United States.'26 Many commentators blame
contingency fees for promoting litigation because they shift the risk
of loss from the plaintiff, often risk-averse, to the attorney, usually
more risk-neutral. 127  While contingency fees may enable more
plaintiffs to pursue a cause of action, there are many criticisms of
the contingency fee system.
First, the rates are sometimes unfair. Attorneys charge a
premium on their fee for bearing the risk of loss, which may
become unreasonable. In the Penzoil case, for example, the
successful attorneys collected more than $2 billion of a $10 billion
award based on their contingency fee arrangement.
128
Second, shifting the risk of loss to the attorney encourages
excessive and unprofessional efforts to win the case at all costs. 129
Third, the system promotes "ambulance chasing," where an
attorney convinces a client to bring a case for the purpose of
generating income for the attorney.
13
D. Calculation of Damages
Unlike juries in Japan, a jury calculates damages for a
products liability suit as a question of fact in the United States. In
addition to economic damages, juries may sometimes award
123. Howlett, supra note 121, at 260.
124. FLEMING, supra note 83, at 174-75.
125. Id. at 147.
126. Klein, supra note 64, at 121.
127. FLEMING, supra note 83, at 197.
128. Id. at 200.
129. Id. at 203.
130. Id. at 204.
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punitive damages.'31 In determining the amount of punitive
damages, the jury may consider the following:
1. The existence and magnitude of the product's danger to the
public;
2. The cost or feasibility of reducing the danger to an accept-
able level;
3. The manufacturer's awareness of the danger;
4. The nature and duration of, and reasons for, the manufactur-
er's failure to act appropriately to discover or reduce the danger;
5. The extent to which the danger was purposely created by the
manufacturer;
6. The extent to which the defendant is subject to federal safety
regulations;
7. The probability that compensatory damages might be
awarded against the defendant in other cases; and
8. The amount of time that has passed since the actions sought
to be deterred.
132
Punitive damages tend to promote litigation by raising the
stakes for the plaintiff and the plaintiff's attorney in a contingency
fee situation 133 because the prevailing plaintiff traditionally
receives punitive damages. 3 4  In response to this tendency, some
states enacted legislation requiring the unsuccessful defendant to
pay some portion of the punitive damages to the state. 35 Legis-
lators hoped that this legislation would deter potential defendants
from engaging in dangerous activities, limit the number of tort
claims, and benefit the state's coffers. In reality, the legislation led
to more out of court settlements, allowing the victim and the
defendant to split the amount that would be payable to the
state. 136 Thus, the legislation still encourages lawsuits.
Judicial remedies are much more accessible for a U.S. plaintiff
than a Japanese plaintiff in a products liability suit. The U.S.
system of compensating tort victims, however, is focused on the
individual, and thus, is extremely inefficient. Besides the formal
court system, however, alternative dispute resolution systems are
131. California allows punitive damages to be awarded for "oppression, fraud, or
malice" on the part of the defendant. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970). This standard
is generally interpreted as "recklessness." FLEMING, supra note 83, at 219.
132. JOHNSON, supra note 90, at 60.
133. FLEMING, supra note 83, at 214.
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also available in Japan.
V. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN JAPAN
A. Existing Alternative Dispute Resolution Methods
Although fewer products liability lawsuits are filed in Japan
than in the United States,1 37 commentators feel the number of
disputes concerning products liability is similar.138  This disparity
implies that the method of resolving the disputes differs.139 Japan
has three types of alternative dispute resolution systems: arbitra-
tion," conciliation, 4 ' and administrative handling of com-
plaints.'42 While the new Products Liability Law will not signifi-
cantly change plaintiffs' recovery in court, it will alter the back-
ground for less formal negotiations between victims and manufac-
turers.14 3  Alternative dispute resolution in Japan offers benefits
to the parties involved in a products liability case, but it will not
guarantee total recovery for victims of defective products.
Nevertheless, through alternative dispute resolution and application
of the new law, the majority of victims will receive some compensa-
tion.'"4
1. Arbitration
Book VIII of the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure governs
arbitration.'45 Although arbitration alleviates some of the prob-
lems associated with litigation, such as cost and time, 4 6 and offers
procedures that are unavailable in other dispute resolution meth-
137. Dauvergne, supra note 5, at 406.
138. Henderson et al., supra note 82, at 284.
139. Id.
140. Takeshi Kojima, Arbitration System in Japan, in CONFLICT AND INTEGRATION:
COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE WORLD TODAY 327 (Inst. Of Comparative Law ed., 1989);
ARBITRATION (G. Levi ed., 1990), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 19, at 77, 82.
141. Bruce E. Barnes & Takeshi Kojima, Comparative Conciliation and Mediation
Systems: The U.S. and Japan (Dec. 1984), in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 19, at 311, 314.
142. Kojima, supra note 57, at 55.
143. Dauvergne, supra note 5, at 419.
144. Id. at 420.
145. MINSOHO arts. 786-805. Although arbitration is regarded as an important dispute
resolution system in Japan, the rules governing arbitration are covered in only 20 articles,
barely covering five pages of text in English. Arbitrators have a great deal of latitude in
the methods they use to investigate and decide'their cases. Also, the minimal number of
rules limits the ways a party can attack an arbitration award.
146. Kojima, supra note 57, at 54.
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ods,'47 parties do not utilize it as often as other alternative
dispute resolution systems.' a
Parties may not feel comfortable using arbitration to resolve
a dispute because they must place all decision-making power in the
arbitrator. For example, if the parties cannot reach an agreement,
the arbitrator will determine the arbitration procedure,149 the
validity of the arbitration agreement,'150  and the ultimate
award.'51 Also, a party may only attack the arbitration award in
limited circumstances. 152  Thus, it seems unlikely that victims of
defective products will turn, in large numbers, to arbitration to
resolve their disputes with manufacturers.
2. Conciliation
Parties use conciliation to reach a compromise agreement,
which the parties reduce to writing and file with the court. This
agreement serves as the final judgment in the dispute.153 As one
of the most widely used forms of dispute resolution,54 concilia-
tion in Japan takes on three forms: chotei,'15 public administra-
tion mediation, and conciliation judgment.'56 Conciliation may
begin with either a petition by one of the parties or by court
order.'57 Conciliation is mandatory in family disputes, such as
divorce, but is voluntary in civil cases.158  The Conciliation
Committees of the Summary and District Courts handle nearly one
quarter of all civil disputes.159
147. For example, an arbitrator is allowed to investigate on his own motion. MINSOHO
art. 795. In court, a judge is not authorized to examine witnesses or experts, except on a
party's motion. Kojima, supra note 140, at 87.
148. Kojima, supra note 140, at 78.
149. MINSOHO art. 794(2).
150. Id. art. 797.
151. Id. art. 799.
152. A court can only cancel the award if the arbitration procedure was incorrect, the
award orders a party to perform an illegal act, or the parties lacked representation in
accordance with the law. Id. art. 801.
153. Sheinwold, supra note 3, at 279.
154. Kojima, supra note 57, at 55.
155. Chotei literally means mediation in Japanese. OBUNSHA'S ESSENTIAL JAPANESE-
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 117 (1990).
156. Barnes & Kojima, supra note 141, at 322.
157. Id. at 325.
158. Id. at 316-19.
159. Kojima, supra note 57, at 55. In 1982, the Agency for General Affairs handled
197,635 cases. The Agency for General Affairs combined with the National Life Center,
local governments, and Consumers Centre resolved a total of 232,006 cases through chotei
•.19961
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In a chotei proceeding, the judge and two lay people"6 work
with the parties to resolve the dispute. The chotei's informal
procedures and the advisory role of the conciliator often eliminate
the need for lawyers to participate in the proceedings. 6'
Public administration mediation is similarly informal. 162 This
procedure was established because litigation was not always the
most effective means for settling disputes, especially where
sensitive family problems, employer-employee relations, or civil
rights were concerned. 63 The conciliators in these agencies often
encourage the stronger party to accept liability without fault,'
6
and thus may protect consumers more effectively than courts.' 65
The conciliation judgment procedure is a hybrid of arbitration
and chotei. In this proceeding, a neutral conciliator listens to both
sides, and then offers a very persuasive opinion. 66
Although conciliation offers many benefits to parties involved
in a dispute, there are some valid criticisms of the procedures. For
example, because the conciliator has such a strong interest in
resolving the matter, he may not engage in a detailed examination
of the relevant facts before forming a proposal for conciliation. 67
Even if the conciliator does investigate, certain facts essential for
a satisfactory dispute resolution may never surface because the
fact-finding procedures are so informal.' 6
3. Administrative Handling of Complaints
The Japanese government requires certain industries to
contribute to a fund that the government uses to compensate
procedures. Id.
160. Unlike the lay people who act as jurors in the United States, the lay people who
work as conciliators are professionals. They earn Y11,800 (roughly $112) per day plus
expenses. Using these professional conciliators reduces the need for lawyers to participate
in the process, thus reducing costs. Barnes & Kojima, supra note 141, at 314-16.
161. Id. In 1982, plaintiffs' lawyers were present in 22.8% of all conciliation cases and
44.7% of all lawsuits in summary and district courts. Similarly, defendants' lawyers were
present in 11% of all conciliation cases and 25.7% of all lawsuits in summary and district
courts. Id. at 56.
162. Barnes & Kojima, supra note 141, at 322.
163. Kojima, supra note 42, at 12, 14.
164. Barnes & Kojima, supra note 141, at 321.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 322.
167. Kojima, supra note 57, at 57.
168. Id.
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victims of defective products in that industry.69 This type of
compensation system is regarded as the most inexpensive and
efficient method of complaint resolution. 170 For example, the Act
Concerning the Fund for Relief of Drug Side Effects 17' allows the
Japanese government to. collect a special tariff on Japanese
pharmaceutical manufacturers.' The Japanese government uses
this fund to compensate people injured by these drugs in a social
security-like manner.173  Many commentators criticize this pro-
gram as biased toward the supporting industry's interests.
174
Thus, while the administrative handling of complaints may be an
excellent program for compensating victims when the disputed
amount is small and does not merit an individual lawsuit, the
program's reputation for bias disqualifies it as an effective solution
when the disputed amount is large.
B. New Alternative Dispute Resolution Methods Arising After
the Enactment of the Products Liability Law
Following the enactment of the new Products Liability Law,
the Japanese government began establishing a system that would
better.protect victims of defective products.175 Although alterna-
tive dispute resolution offers merits, many consumers knew nothing
about the existence of such programs.'76 In order to educate the
public about their rights under the new law, the Japanese govern-
ment held seminars about the new law in 365 locations nationwide,
sent out pamphlets and books to consumers, distributed videotapes
and audiotapes to local governments, and ran commercials on
television, radio, and in magazines. 7   Further, the government
created institutes to settle products liability disputes out of
court 1 78 and established mechanisms to send product technology
169. Dauvergne, supra note 5, at 404..
170. Robert C. Weber, Japanese Law Edges Westward, NAT'L L. J., Apr. 6, 1992, at 13.
171. MINPO, Law No. 55 of 1979.
172. Sheinwold, supra note 3, at 282.
173. Id.
174. Product Liability Law Should Be Viewed as Challenge, Not Threat, NIKKEI WKLY.,
July 24, 1995, Editorial and Commentary at 6.
175. Government, Industry Preparing for Debut of PL Law, COMLINE Daily News
Chemicals & Materials, July 13, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ASIAPC File.
176. Hayashida, supra note 9.
177. Government, Industry Preparing for Debut of PL Law, supra note 175.
178. The Economic Planning Agency hopes most defective product victims will make
use of an alternative dispute resolution program even after the new Products Liability Law
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experts to dispute settlement panels.179 In the future, the govern-
ment plans to strengthen these programs."
The official complaint-filing procedure for defective products
under the new Products Liability Law will work as follows:
1. The victim will file a complaint at the Complaint Center
(Center)' 81 in his prefecture.
2. The Center will mediate between the individual and the
manufacturer.
3. If the mediation is unsuccessful, the Center will refer the
case to a Complaints Settlement Committee composed of attorneys,
former judges, and specialists on the product in question.1 82 This
team will work as an arbitration panel and resolve the dispute. 83
Using the Centers for dispute resolution offers consumers
cheap and timely settlements. The Centers have a toll-free
telephone number, so inquiries into possible claims are free for
consumers." The Centers also provide advice and mediation
free of charge. 85 If the claim proceeds to arbitration and the
damage amount is less than Y100,000 (approximately $910), the
mediation fee is Y2000 (approximately $18).186 Further, the
Centers must resolve all disputes within 90 days."
The program undoubtedly goes far in educating the general
population about their new rights under the Products Liability Law
is effective because court proceedings cost the government, the consumer, and the
manufacturer time and money. PL Ho to Kurashi [Products Liability Law and Lifestyle],
YOMIURI SHINBUN, June 30, 1995, at 9. For example, if someone filed a lawsuit under the
new Products Liability Law for damages of V5,000,000 (approximately $45,500), it would
cost about V500,000 (approximately $4550) in court fees and take at least two years in
litigation due to the newness of the law and small number of attorneys. PL Tokushu
[Product Liability Special Edition], KASHIKOI SHOHISHA [SMART CONSUMER], July 1, 1995,
at 2.
179. Government, Industry Preparing for Debut of PL Law, supra note 175.
180. EPA's FY '96 Budget Requests Up 4.7%, Japan Economic Newswire, Aug. 28, 1995,
available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, Japan File. The budget request included Y2,680
million to strengthen the government-run Better Living Information Center. Id.
181. Complaint Centers exist in all prefectures for home appliances, automobiles, gas
and oil appliances, chemical products, bicycles, furniture, stationery, tableware, daily
necessities, disaster prevention products, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, and foods. Hayashida,
supra note 9.
182. EPA Releases Guidelines on Product-Liability Law, NIKKEI WKLY., June 26, 1995,
Economy at 2.
183. Hayashida, supra note 9.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. EPA Releases Guidelines on Product-Liability Law, supra note 182, at 2.
187. Hayashida, supra note 9.
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and improving recovery for victims. This program, however, may
not provide much assistance to consumers because the prefectural
centers have a policy of not releasing much of their gathered
information."8  Also, the program is likely to face the same
problems currently encountered in conciliation and in the adminis-
trative handling of complaints. As government-run centers, the
mediators will have every incentive to settle cases quickly and little
motivation to work as advocates for the victims' rights. Thus,
although the victims may recover more with the new Products
Liability Law and prefectural centers, satisfying the purpose of the
Products Liability Law,'89 they still will not recover as completely
as their rights under tort law would require. Fortunately, manufac-
turers are changing the way they produce and market products to
reduce exposure to liability.
VI. SOCIAL CHANGES SINCE THE PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW'S
ENACTMENT
The new Products Liability Law has undoubtedly forced
businesses and consumers to become more safety conscious.90
Product liability insurance policies are also in greater demand.'9 '
Roughly one-third of manufacturing firms and the majority of
Japanese firms with more than 1000 employees plan to take out
products liability insurance.'92 Insurance does not completely
resolve, however, the products liability problem. Policy payouts
are usually limited and do not cover cases of clear negligence.'93
To avoid the risk of a products liability lawsuit, companies are
strengthening their products' safety.'94 For example, Matsushita
Electric Company now "double checks and triple checks" all
188. Japan's Product Liability Law Poised to Go Into Effect, Japan Economic Newswire,
June 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Japan File.
189. See SEIZOBUTSU SEKININ HO, supra note 2.
190. Noriko Sato, Product Liability Law to Debut in Japan, Japan Economic Newswire,
June 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Japan File.
191. The product liability law is expected tQ create a ¥200 billion market for the nonlife
insurance industry. Product Liability Insurance Growing Popular, Jiji Press Ticker Service,
July 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Japan File.
192. Id.
193. Product Liability Law Should Be Viewed as Challenge, Not Threat, supra note 174,
at 6.
194. Sato, supra note 190.
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products leaving the warehouse. 19 5 A large toy manufacturer is
coating the small parts of its toys with a chemical that tastes bad,
discouraging children from putting the small parts in their
mouths. 96 New appliances feature safety devices, such as an
electric heater with a built-in sensor that automatically turns off the
heater if it senses vibrations or if the heater topples.97
In addition to increasing the safety level of their products,
manufacturers are teaching salesmen a new sales approach. Rather
than merely emphasizing a product's positive characteristics during
a sales presentation, salesmen now explain the product's proper
usage and warn of possible consequences of improper usage.98
Similarly, drug manufacturers are reviewing their package
inserts and making more voluntary disclosures of possible adverse
reactions."9 Further, many drug and medical equipment manu-
facturers are refraining from concealing the recalls of their
defective products.
2°°
In extreme cases, some manufacturers, fearing liability, are
leaving the market.20' Both Shin-Etsu Chemical Company and
Toshiba Silicone Company, who dominated the silicone market,
shut down because of the new Products Liability Law. 2 Japa-
nese manufacturers who used the silicone products in their own
products are now forced to seek foreign sources of silicone.2 3
As for consumers, awareness of the new Products Liability
Law seems to discourage people from merely suffering the losses
they experience with defective products. 2 4  Knowledge of the
195. Id. (quoting Shoji Fuji, Public Relations Department of Matsushita Electric
Industrial Company).
196. PL Tokushu [Product Liability Special Edition], supra note 178, at 4. The company
uses Disodium Benzoate, which is the most bitter tasting substance. Id.
197. New Electric Heaters Feature Safety Devices, Japan Economic Newswire, Aug. 4,
1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Japan File.
198. Anta no Kaisha mo Abunaizo!! (Your Company Is Also In Danger!], GENDAI
(Japan), June 30, 1995, at 17.
199. Enforcement of PL Law and Industry's Reactions, COMLINE Daily News
Biotechnology & Med. Tech., June 26, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Japan File.
200. Id.
201. Norri Kageki, Product Liability Law Scares Silicone Firms Out of Market, Toshiba
Silicone, Shin-Etsu Stop Supplying Coating for Needles, NIKKEI WKLY., Aug. 28, 1995,
Industry Digest at 9.
202. Id. Bunjiro Murai, Director of Toshiba Silicone Co., explained they "don't want
to risk a lawsuit." Id.
203. Id.
204. PL Ho to Kurashi, supra note 178, at 9.
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Products Liability Law, however, is still limited.2 5 Thus, many
consumers still do not recover damages due to defective products.
VII. CONCLUSION
Japan's new Products Liability Law improves recovery for
victims of defective products both substantively and systematically.
Substantively, it changes the standard of liability from negligence
to strict liability, and systematically, it provides programs that allow
more individuals to recover for their injuries.
Japanese civil procedure rules and other factors limit plaintiffs'
ability to recover in court. The courts are not very accessible to
individuals because the rules are inflexible. U.S. courts, in contrast,
focus on the individual, and thus, have more flexible procedural
rules. U.S. courts are far more open to plaintiffs than Japanese
courts, but at a cost. The U.S. judicial system operates inefficiently
because litigants spend so much time arguing about the procedural
rules and so much money on legal fees.
The development of alternative dispute resolution in Japan
diminishes the effects of an inaccessible court system. Although
the lack of attention to individual plaintiffs may deny recovery to
the full extent that tort law would demand, the alternative dispute
resolution system's establishment and "further growth, both
encouraged by the new Products Liability Law, provide at least
some recovery for products liability claims. The Products Liability
Law thus offers more compensation to victims of defective
products, especially when the claim is minor.
The new law has encouraged manufacturers to accept more
responsibility for the products they place on the market. Not only
are manufacturers purchasing insurance policies to cover whatever
liability they may face, but they are also taking more preventative
measures to avoid injuring consumers. The Products Liability Law,
in this sense, most broadly improves consumer welfare in Japan.
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